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2Competition among pressure groups for political influence
over the determination of accounting standards
ABSTRACT
This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities
by testing the empirical implications of Becker’s (1983) theory of competition among
pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards.
The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure
groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members
(users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in
1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives
(including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures
in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each
group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines
the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found
that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence
over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no
group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension
plans.
Keywords: Competition, pressure groups, pension plans.
JEL Classification: G2, L3, M4
31. Introduction
Accounting academics have long recognised that accounting standard setting
is a political process (e.g.: Zeff, 1972, 1993; Gerboth, 1973). Motivated by the need to
explain the source of these pressures on accounting standard-setting, Watts and
Zimmerman (1978) (‘WZ’) develop a positive theory of the determination of
accounting standards.  Their empirical work identifies the various factors that drive
corporate managers to lobby for or against the introduction of supplementary general
price level adjusted financial statements. WZ motivated the development of a
significant literature over the next two decades which examined the determinants of
managerial accounting policy choices and their lobbying of accounting standards.
However this literature does not account for the fact that accounting standard
setting process has now become institutionalised to the point where accounting
standard setters around the world often develop conflicting views over the same issue
(arising from the possible endorsement of IASC standards by the SEC). Second, while
WZ focused on factors influencing lobbying behaviour of individual corporate
managers in supplying financial statements, contemporary accounting rule-making
processes involve pressures from other powerful groups that try to use political
influence to enhance their welfare (e.g.: Owsen, 1996). Third, prior empirical studies
of lobbying behaviour assume that groups only seek to influence the accounting
standard setting process via formal lobbying submissions (Robinson and Walker,
1993; Walker and Robinson, 1994). However many issues affecting the determination
of accounting standards are resolved in informal settings, beyond the glare of the
media and the public.1 Finally, research stimulated by WZ does not study political
influence as the primary variable of interest - instead size is included as an
4explanatory variable to proxy ‘political costs’ affecting managers’ lobbying or
accounting policy choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).
This study adopts an alternative view, formalised by Becker’s (1983)
economic theory of regulation, that competition among multiple pressure groups for
political influence determines the equilibrium structure of cash flow costs and benefits
that arise from the determination of accounting standards. This view recognises that
political influence is not simply fixed by the political process, but is expanded by
expenditures of time and money in various ways that exert political pressure,
including managerial accounting policy choice. Becker’s theory has to date received
little attention from prior accounting researchers, possibly due to the lack of
observable data sources, and/or the econometric difficulties involved in deriving
empirical proxies for political pressure and influence functions that are assumed to be
endogenously determined.2
This paper examines the empirical implications of Becker’s (1983) theory for
analysing how various interest groups seek to shape the political processes
surrounding accounting standard rule-making. It is posited that political pressures and
political influence functions are endogenous. Thus, analysis of marginal political
pressures and political influences requires simultaneous estimation of both the
pressure and political influence functions. Empirical estimation of the simultaneous
equations is complicated by the fact that marginal pressure is not directly observable.
Managerial discretion over accounting policy and financial disclosures, as well as
economic factors affecting the performance of pension funds, are posited to affect
each group’s pressure functions.
Becker’s (1983) theory can be tested in the setting where pressure groups
develop competing Australian pension plan financial reporting rules. Australian
5Accounting Standard 25 (AAS 25), issued in 1990, required the balance sheet
recognition of the accrued liability for members’ benefits by both defined benefit
pension plans (‘DBPPs’) and defined contribution pension plans (‘DCPPs’), thus
revealing a net periodic ‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’.3 Differences in the level of voluntary
compliance with AAS 25 between DCPPs and DBPPs are posited to significantly
affect the nature of the competition among supplier (industry) and user (member)
groups. Prior survey evidence finds evidence of differential voluntary accounting and
disclosure practices by DBPPs and DCPPs just prior to the implementation of AAS 25
(Anderson and Sharpe, 1992; Klumpes, 1994b; Herbohn and Buchan, 1995). DBPP
managers opposed AAS 25 due to its proprietary cost implications, while DCPP
managers supported AAS 25 for political visibility reasons (Klumpes, 1998).
The sample comprises 54 DBPPs and 54 DCPPs voluntarily producing
accounting reports in the period 1992-3. As predicted, only supplier group pressure
characteristics (cost and fee structures, discretion over accounting policy choice and
financial disclosure) are found to significantly affect political influence over the
determination of DBPP accounting standards. Neither supplier nor user pressure
function variables are found to be significantly associated with a political influence
function that is assumed to determine group attitudes to equivalent DCPP accounting
standards.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines Becker’s
model and demonstrates why the Australian pension plan financial reporting provides
an appropriate venue to empirically examine the theory. Section 3 discusses various
factors that are posited to affect each group’s propensity to apply pressure for political
influence. Section 4 describes the sample and develops proxies. Section 5 presents the
statistical procedures and primary results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
62. Theoretical and institutional background
This section provides the background required to understand the theoretical
antecedents (section 2.1) and the choice of institutional setting (section 2.2).
2.1. Theoretical Background
WZ recognized that, due to the political nature of the accounting standard
setting process, accounting standards are shaped by lobbying efforts of affected
preparers, users and auditors. Their empirical framework has been used to examine
the incentives of corporate managers to lobby for or against proposed accounting
standards. A separate body of research stimulated by WZ has examined the factors
affecting the choice of accounting methods in coporations (e.g.: Bowen et al., 1981;
Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979) and in municipalities (Zimmerman, 1977).
Accounting is viewed by WZ as a product of rational decision makers and as a
mechanism for controlling potential conflicts of interest between principals (e.g.:
stockholders, voters) and agents (i.e. managers, elected officials). WZ suggest that the
choice of measurement method will concern the accounting decision-maker if it
affects the cash flows to the system and/or the manager’s personal compensation. In
analyses of corporate accounting policy choice, the effect on a firm’s cash flows is
asserted to occur because of debt contracts, bonus contracts and other contracts
expressed in terms of accounting numbers. Hence, the effect on corporate managers’
cash flows is hypothesized to occur because of direct or indirect effects of accounting
numbers on management’s compensation and the labour market’s assessment of
management’s performance (Stone et al., 1987).
WZ rely on an underlying economic theory of regulation which assumes that
7politicians and regulators maximise their own self-interest, and that there are nonzero
information production and political costs involved in the political process. This
assumption has important consequences for the subsequent development of positive
accounting theory (hereinafter ‘PAT’) and the two decades of empirical research that
it stimulated. First, it provides a theoretical basis for a firm’s accounting procedures to
affect its lobbying as part of the political process of determining accounting standards.
Second, it enables PAT researchers to adopt a ‘property rights’ theory of the firm to
develop theories of accounting practice (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). However WZ
(p. 112) acknowledge this assumption is limited and that there is a need for theory to
more explicitly model competition among interest groups for political influence.
The economic theory of regulation upon which WZ based their analysis had
been developed by an earlier generation of economists at the University of Chicago
(Stigler, 1971; Pelzman, 1976). It depicts industry as essentially driving regulatory
processes; politicians are assumed merely to transmit pressures of industry groups
who seek regulation. By contrast, Becker (1983) reconciles both ‘private interest’ and
‘public interest’ views of regulation. He analyses how interest groups ‘compete’
within the context of rules that translate expenditures on political pressure (in the form
of time, energy and money) into political influence and access to political resources.4
Thus a single group cannot simply ‘dominate’ the political process, but must compete
with others to attract political influence. Even if the manager of a firm chose to lobby
against a proposed accounting change, a successful final regulatory outcome is not
guaranteed.
Becker’s (1983) theory implies that competition among these interest groups
determines the equilibrium structure of the perceived costs, benefits and other
political favours for each group that are associated with the determination of
8accounting standards. Formally, the total costs (S)  equals the total benefits (Becker,
1983, p. 373):
nsG(Rs)=S=ntF(Rt) (1)
Where ns and nt are the total number of members of each group,  and Rs and Rt
is the benefits and costs paid to or by each member. G is the cost of providing Rs
while F is the benefit of Rt.
The costs imposed on t is determined by an influence function that depends on
the pressure (p) exerted by s and t and other variables (x):
ntF(Rt)=-It(ps,pt,x)
 nsG(R)=Is(ps,pt,x) (2)
The political budget equation in (2) clearly implies that these influence
functions cannot be independent because increased influence benefits flowing to s
from regulation must be financed by imposing costs on t, and hence must lower the
influence of t. That is,
ntF(Rt)=It=nsG(Rs)=Is; Is +It = 0 (3)
Equality between the total costs and benefits associated with implementing an
accounting standard  implies that aggregate influence is zero: increased influence of
some groups decreases the influence of others by equal amounts. Therefore, the
political game modelled in Becker’s (1983) paper is zero-sum in influence. The
empirical implications of Becker’s theory for understanding the determination of
accounting standards depend upon the strength of association between individual
pressure group functions (equation 2) and the political influence function (equation 3).
2.2. An institutional setting
Becker’s (1983) model of competition among pressure groups for political
9influence can be applied to accounting environments where (i) discretionary, non-
cosmetic accounting choices are available to each group; (ii) these choices can in turn
affect a group’s propensity to apply political influence; (iii) the structure of
accounting choices and incentives for producing pressure in order to obtain political
influence are endogenous; and (iv) political influence over the determination of
accounting standards can be approximated by the relations as set out in equations (1)
to (3) above.
Becker’s (1983) theory has previously been empirically applied to examine
interactions among pressure groups over government regulation of pensions and
financial service products.5 The financial reporting practices of the Australian pension
fund industry during the period 1991-1992 relevant to this study because managers
could elect to adopt competing industry-developed ‘best practice’ guidelines and a
professional accounting standard (AAS 25) developed by the Australian Accounting
Research Foundation (‘AARF’). These alternative standards substantially differed in
their interpretation about both the ownership of pension fund surpluses and deficits
and the extent of financial disclosures to be reported to members (Klumpes, 1994a).
The institutional arrangements affecting the Australian pension industry
involve an economic relationship between industry-based financial intermediaries and
members for both DCPPs and DBPPs. The ownership structure of both types of
pension fund are governed by the unique and delegated agency relationships between
relatively unsophisticated pension fund members and their sponsoring employers (‘the
principals’) and the pension fund intermediaries (‘the agents’) that legally define the
fund. These relationships are economically significant since pension funds and the
financial intermediaries which manage them hold more equities than do individual
investors in UK and US financial markets (Davis, 1995). The existence of non-trivial
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fee-based financial intermediary services to the pension fund industry suggests that
agency problems exist in the financial management of pension funds, just as they do
in the management of corporate assets, since financial intermediaries managing
pension funds are self-interested agents and their abilities and effort levels are only
imperfectly observable (Brennan, 1993). This relationship involves the demand and
supply of fee-based industry-based financial intermediation services. These services
require pension funds to pay both discretionary managerial expenses, and professional
management fees for providing this service to pension fund members (Klumpes and
McCrae, 1998).
These institutional setting meets a number of restrictive conditions that is
deemed suitable for the empirical validation of Becker’s (1983) theory for a number
of reasons. First, there are two narrow pressure groups, one representing suppliers of
pension fund financial reports (‘the industry association’) and another representing
members as users of pension plan financial reports (‘AARF’), that attempted to
influence the rule-making process (Klumpes, 1994a). Australian legislation requires
that the ownership structure of pension funds comprises equal representation by both
employee members and their employers.6 Second, relative to industry-based reporting
rules, AAS 25 has a material, non-cosmetic effect on the adopting entity’s balance
sheet, by requiring pension funds to recognise a present-value accrued pension benefit
obligation, and to include detailed financial statements in reports sent to members.
Third, AAS 25 has clearly differentiable economic effects for DCPPs and DBPPs.
DCPPs are by definition fully-funded, whereas DBPPs can be either under-or over-
funded and can be affected by the employer sponsors’ funding and asset allocation
policy.  Fourth, there is a one-time, non-reversible voluntary switch available to adopt
AAS 25 during the period 1991-1992.7 Finally, Klumpes and McCrae (1998)
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demonstrate that there was an endogenous relationship between the demand by
pension funds for industry–based financial intermediation services (captured by costs)
and the marginal fee for this reputation (proxied by fees) during this period. These
endogenous relationships, which enter Becker’s (1983) model as pressure functions of
users and suppliers respectively, are not directly affected by the adoption of AAS 25.
3.  Factors influencing competition among interest groups for political influence
Becker’s theory (1983) implies that various factors affect the pressure
functions of both industry association (supplier) and AARF (user) groups, which in
turn will enter as sources of political influence over the determination of accounting
standards.
3.1.. Industry association (suppliers)
WZ assume that corporate managers are self-interested and that their lobbying
and accounting policy choice behaviour is primarily motivated by self-interest.
Similarly it is assumed that the propensity of the industry association group to apply
political pressure is proportional to the level of professional intermediary fees and
expenses that are charged to pension funds. The industry is thus posited to generate
political pressure via the fees charged for performing this service (FEEi). This in turn
is mitigated by members’ countervailing political pressure via the costs incurred by
the financial intermediary to operate the pension plan (COSTi). Conceptually, political
pressure applied by suppliers in supplying financial reporting to members also
depends on incentives related to managerial discretion over accounting policy choice
(PASi), and the value-relevance of information disclosed.  Klumpes and McCrae
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(1998) identify investment risk as the primary financial characteristic of financial
intermediaries that affected their supply of services to Australian pension funds in
1991-92. Prior research (Amir and Benartzi, 1998) demonstrates that investment
strategy is regarded as value-relevant to users because it indicates the professional
abilities of pension fund financial intermediaries (INVRISKi):
FEEi = f (COSTi, PASi, INVRISKi) (4)
3.1.1. AARF (users)
AARF represents the interest of users as it argued that greater accountability
of the pension fund industry, in the form of AAS 25, was in the public interest
(Klumpes, 1993). AARF’s ability to apply political pressure is related to the level of
non-trivial discretionary expenses charged to the pension fund’s members by
professional industry-based financial intermediaries (COSTi). There are a number of
sources of this cost. First, industry-based financial intermediaries periodically charge
professional (administration and investment) management fees for operating pension
fund assets and liabilities (FEEi). These fees are calculated as a periodic fraction of
total invested funds under management and can significantly reduce the assets
available to pay members’ benefits. Such costs are discretionary as they are otherwise
avoidable by self-administered pension funds (Klumpes and McCrae, 1998).
AARF also exerts political pressure through its ability to influence the form
and content of financial information that is provided in annual member reports
(DISCLi). AARF proposed that the pension fund industry produce ‘general purpose
financial reports’ containing annual detailed financial statements, while the industry
argued that such information would only serve to confuse and mislead members
(Klumpes, 1994a). Klumpes (1994b) and Herbohn and Buchan (1995) find that the
13
design of pension fund annual reports sent to members by Australian pension funds
during 1991-92 was sensitive to the demand for detailed versus abbreviated
information by users. Klumpes and McCrae (1998) also find that the age of pension
fund members is the primary agency-cost characteristic of Australian pension funds
that affects the demand for financial intermediary reputation. The age profile of the
membership structure of the pension plan affects the periodic cash inflow or outflow
each year (MATRISKi). Bodie et al. (1987) find that this variable significantly affects
the funding strategy of US pension funds.  This pension fund financial characteristic
is also posited to affect the propensity to generate political pressure.
Conceptually, this formulation of the sources affecting pressure applied by
members can be summarised as follows:
COSTi = fi(FEEi, DISCLi, MATRISKi) (5)
3.1.3. Competition for political influence
Consistent with prior accounting literature, it is assumed that political
influence over the determination of accounting standards is proxied by fund size
(SIZEi). However the nature of political influence is expected to differ between
various types of fund. Klumpes (1994b) presents anecdotal evidence to suggest that
larger DBPPs were closely associated with industry lobbying groups who opposed
mandated accounting standards, whereas larger DCPPs supported these changes. Both
direct and indirect pressures applied by both groups can affect their ability to secure
political influence over the determination of accounting standards. Financial
intermediaries seek to exert political influence both directly through fees and
indirectly via their discretion over voluntary accounting choice (PASi). Members seek
to obtain political influence directly through the level of expenses paid for the
14
provision of financial intermediated services (COSTi) and indirectly through the
extent of voluntary disclosure practices of their funds (DISCLi). Combining these
factors into equation form, the following generalised political influence function is
hypothesised:
LNSIZEi = fii(FEEi, COSTi, PASi, DISCLi) (5)
It should be noted that FEE, COST and LNSIZE are simultaneously determined.
4. Data Selection and Variable Descriptions
4.1. Sample Selection
The sample was selected on the basis of a two step procedure. First, the
sample was chosen to be representative of the population of Australian pension funds
during 1992-93 (ISC, 1993). Thus, the sample was first split evenly between DCPPs
and DBPPs and then stratified by industry classification (private and public sector).
Second, a sample of pension funds whose address details were published in the
industry digest were asked to supply copies of their annual financial reports and
annual reports sent to members. The final sample comprises 54 DCPPs and 54
DBPPs.
4.2. Variable descriptions
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample DBPPs  (Panel A) and
DCPPs (Panel B).
-------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------
The sample of DCPPs, relative to the sample of DBPPs, on average adopted
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more stringent forms of PAS and voluntarily disclosed more items of financial
information in their annual member reports during the study period.8 They also
incurred, on average, relatively higher periodic financial intermediary fees and
expenses, but bore significantly lower maturity risk than the sample of DBPPs.
The following variables were used to proxy the various pressure functions and
the political influence functions as described in the simultaneous equations model
specified by equations (1) to (3);
‘PAS’ is a dichotomous variable which proxies for the type of PAS used. Financial
intermediaries preparing pension plan annual reports used either industry-based PAS
(=0) or AAS-based PAS (=1).
‘DISCL’ is a categorical variable which proxies for the extent of voluntary financial
disclosure contained in pension annual reports.9 This comprises five items: an audit
report, statement of financial position, statement of changes in financial position,
investment performance report, and a summary of the actuarial report. Pension plans
which included none of these items scored zero (=0); those which included all items
scored five (=5).
‘MARFEE’ proxies the variable FEE for financial intermediary reputation in PAS
choice. This is calculated as the total marginal periodic fees paid to financial
intermediaries (trustees, investment managers, administrators) of the sample of
Australian pension funds for the twelve months ended 30 June 1993, or nearest
reporting date, as a percentage of the total invested assets of the plan. In the empirical
tests the log of the total fee (‘LNFEE’) replaced this variable.
‘MARCOST’ is calculated as the total marginal costs paid for the administration and
management of the sample of Australian pension funds for the twelve months ended
30 June 1993, or nearest reporting date, as a percentage of the net assets of the plan.
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In the empirical tests this variable is replaced by the log of the total costs
(‘LNCOST’).
 ‘MATRISK’ is a proxy for the pension plan’s sensitivity to solvency. The older the
age profile of pension plan members, the greater is the cash flow needed to fund
benefits, which must be funded from investments. It is measured as the relationship of
total contributions received, plus gross investment returns, less total benefit payments
over the year ended 30 June 1993, divided by total assets of the pension fund as at 30
June 1993. During 1992-93, there was considerable political pressure placed on
pension plan financial intermediaries to maintain a pension fund’s solvency
(Klumpes, 1994a).
‘INVRISK’ is a proxy of the risk that the pension plan’s portfolio is invested in non-
liquid financial products which cannot be used to fund current benefit payments. It
measures the percentage of pension plan total assets that comprised classes of risky
assets (e.g.: fixed interest bonds, stocks, property) as at 30 June 1993, that are not
otherwise available to fund benefit payments for the year ended 30 June 1993.
‘LNSIZE’ is a proxy for political costs used by prior empirical accounting studies. It
measures the net market value of assets of a pension plan in A$ million, as at 30 June
1993. For statistical testing purposes (see discussion below) these were converted to
natural log scale.
Table 2 presents, for both DBPP (Panel A) and DCPP (Panel B) samples, bi-
variate correlations among the factors affecting political pressure and influence
functions. The high correlation between FEE and COST, for both types of fund, are
expected since these variables are treated as endogenous. On the other hand, the high
correlations between DISCLXT and FEE (DBPP) and PAS and FEE (DCPP) are
unexpected and may affect the ability to meaningfully interpret the coefficients related
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to the political pressure influence functions. However these high correlations are
removed when log-based fee and cost functions are substituted for marginal functions
in the empirical tests, the results of which are reported below.
-------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
-------------------------------------------
5. Empirical Tests
In analysing the causes and effects of competition among pressure groups for
political influence, a basic linear model of the three-equation simultaneous system
developed above is estimated. Specifically, it is assumed that all disturbances are
normally distributed. Exploratory data analysis and specification tests indicated that
this assumption appears to be reasonable. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is therefore
applied to estimate the following model:
e++++= iiii INVRISKaPASaCOSTaaFEE 3210  (7)
i
iiii MATRISKbDISCLbFEEbbCOST e++++= 3210         (8)
ii
iiii DISCLcPAScCOSTcFEEccLNSIZE e+++++= 43210                       (9)
In evaluating the results of this model, the following expectations are made
regarding the signs of the coefficients:
(7): a1 > 0; a2, a3 < 0.
(8): b1, b3  > 0; b2 < 0 (DBPP) and > 0 (DCPP).
(9): c4 < 0; c1, c3 > 0 (DBPP) and < 0 (DCPP); c2 < 0 (DBPP) and > 0 (DCPP).
Coefficients a3 in equation (7) and b3 in equation (8), respectively, represent
agency cost-related variables. Coefficients a2 and b2 represent indirect pressure via
discretion over accounting policy choice and voluntary disclosure. Coefficients a1 and
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b1 represent mitigating political pressure from the opposing interest group. The
estimated coefficients on the political pressure variables in equations (7) and (8) are
expected to be of opposite signs for DBPPs and DCPPs, reflecting alternative
assumptions about the countervailing impact of political pressure by opposing groups.
Equation (9) recognises the endogenous relation between political influence
and interest group pressure functions, either when measured directly by cost and fee
functions (c1 and c2), or indirectly by discretion over accounting or disclosure policy
(c3 and c4). Consistent with the differential expectations for DBPPs and DCPPs,
coefficients c1, c2 and c3 are also predicted to differ between these types of fund.
5.1. Results - DBPPs
Results from the basic model for DBPPs for the marginal fee and cost
functions appear in Table 3. Panel A.
------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------
For equation (7), all variables have coefficients of the predicted sign, and
MARCOST is statistically significant. The overall model is significant at the 0.01
level, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.42. For equation (8), all variables have
coefficients of the predicted sign. However only MARFEE is statistically significant.
The overall model is significant at the 0.01 level with an adjusted R-squared of 0.45.
For equation (9), all variables are of the predicted sign, and MARFEE and PAS are
statistically significant. The overall model is statistically significant at the 0.01 level,
with an adjusted R-squared of 0.38.
Overall, the strength of statistical association between political influence,
MARFEE and PAS, but not COST or DISCLXT, supports the relations predicted by
hypothesis 1. However the above empirical tests assume that political pressure is
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linearly increasing in marginal fees, and the validity of these relationships is subject to
the high correlation between MARFEE, PAS and SIZE. Copley et al. (1995) show that
the relationship of audit fees to auditor reputation in the US public sector is not linear,
and use log fees in estimating the simultaneous demand and supply of audit reputation
in this market. By analogy it is also possible that financial intermediary fees are also
not linear. To examine the sensitivity of results to this assumption, and to remove the
possible correlation problems associated with MARFEE, log fee and cost functions are
substituted for marginal fees and costs. The results for DBPPs are reported in Panel B
of Table 3.
The significance and signs of all the coefficients reported in Panel B are
identical to that reported in Panel A, except for PAS, which now has a negative sign.
The overall model F tests for all models are also significant at the 1 percent level, but
the adjusted R-squares are slightly lower. These results demonstrate that the basic
relationships hold even if the alternative linear assumption about costs and fees
reported in Table 3 is removed.  The results also fully support the predicted strength
of association between user and supplier pressure functions and political influence.
5.2. Results - DCPPs
Results from the basic marginal fee and marginal cost model are reported for
DCPPs in table 4, Panel A.
------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
------------------------------------------
For equation (7), all variables have coefficients of the predicted sign and
MARCOST and PAS are statistically significant. The overall model is significant at the
0.01 level, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.53. For equation (8), all variables have
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coefficients of the predicted sign, but only MARFEE is statistically significant. The
overall model is significant at the 0.01 level with an adjusted R-squared of 0.41. For
equation (9), all variables have coefficients of the expected direction, but only PAS is
statistically significant. The overall model is not statistically significant and has an
adjusted R-squared of only 0.04.
These results are the prediction that neither group appears to exert significant
political influence over the determination of DCPP financial reporting rules. Table 4,
Panel B reports the results for DCPPs under the alternative assumption of non-linear
fee and cost functions. Once again the significance and signs of most the coefficients
are identical to those reported in Panel A, although MATRISK is now statistically
significant (equation 8). The overall model F tests for all models, except for equation
(9), are also significant at the 1 percent level, but the adjusted R-squares are slightly
higher. These results suggest pension fund costs and fees are non-linear, which is
consistent with evidence of size-related fees and cost behaviour in the fund
management industry.
6. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on Becker’s (1983) theory of
competition among pressure groups for political influence in the context of Australian
pension accounting rule making. The analysis relied on the assumption that
accounting policy choice and voluntary disclosure of financial information in annual
member reports are credible proxies of political pressure functions of supplier and
user groups. A variety of signalling and monitoring incentives were posited to affect
the political pressure and influence functions, which were assumed to be endogenous.
The main conclusions are that for both DCPPs and DBPPs, the industry
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association exerted the most political pressure, which influenced the form of PAS
mandated for annual member reports. However its political pressure functions
translated into political influence for the DBPP sample only. These results are
consistent with prior survey evidence indicating that DBPPs opposed AAS 25 and
obtained government sanction for alternative industry-based pension accounting rules.
However these results are only tentative and must be treated with extreme
caution. Some caveats may limit the validity of inferences that can be drawn from
these results. First, the model assumes, consistent with the results of prior empirical
research (Klumpes and McCrae, 1998), that supplier fees and users’ costs are
measurable proxies for their political pressure functions. It is also assumed, consistent
with prior empirical accounting literature, that political influence is adequately
proxied by size. These approximations may in fact be capturing other omitted
variables and ignores the fact that pressure and influence functions are hard to
measure. Second, lobbying activities and pressure applied by other groups in the
subsequent formal submissions process were effectively ignored (e.g.: accounting
firms). If these other groups significantly influence rule-making outcomes, the
explanatory power of the model is correspondingly reduced.
Subject to these caveats, this study extends the literature that attempts to
explain political activity surrounding accounting standard rule making in many ways.
First, this study empirically examines hypothesised relationships implied by Becker’s
(1983) theory of competition among multiple pressure groups for political pressure, in
an accounting rule making setting. These relationships contrast with those examined
by prior empirical research studying accounting regulation and political activity,
which assumes either that corporate managers drive the accounting standard process,
and/or use size to proxy political costs as an independent, explanatory variable for
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accounting policy choice. In contrast, in the institutional setting of Australian pension
plan accounting rule-making activities, political pressure functions of multiple groups
are assumed to be endogenous with political influence. Accounting policy and
voluntary disclosure choices are thus treated as variables that may explain the overall
rule-development process, together with other agency-related and management
incentive factors.
Second, fee and cost functions are introduced into the accounting literature as
proxies of the pressures assumed to drive political activities surrounding pension
accounting standard setting processes. It is likely that equivalent industry-specific
pressure factors will politically influence standard setting activities in other
institutional environments. Future research is expected to develop methods and which




1. Zeff (1998) cites growing evidence of collaborative activities among ‘G4+1’
accounting standard setting bodies).
2. Empirical studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying behaviour typically do
not address the broader policy question of whether such behaviour actually
influences the subsequent course of accounting rule development.
3. Klumpes (1994a) reports that these liabilities were excluded from the balance
sheet recognition requirements of competing industry-developed standards, which
were later sanctioned by government regulations for the annual preparation of
membership financial reports. Stone et al. (1987) study the development of
competing accounting standards for U.S. public sector pension funds.
4. Becker (1983, 371) claims that this model unifies the view that regulation (e.g.:
accounting standard setting) activities correct market failures with the alternative
view that they favour the politically powerful: both are produced by the
competition for political influence.
5. Becker’s (1983) model has previously been applied to examine political game
plays between interest groups related to the congressional reviews of US financial
services regulation (Randall and Krosner, 1995).
6.  The role of the employer sponsor in the determination of Australian pension fund
accounting standards is somewhat ambiguous, since firm cash flows are not
directly affected by pension fund financial reporting. For DBPPs, employer
sponsors face incentives that are both compatible (i.e. provide retirement income
insurance) and incompatible (i.e. conflict over the ownership of surplus/deficit)
with that of their employees. These incentive problems do not apply to DCPPs,
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since employees bear all the investment and funding risk themselves. Consistent
with prior research, it is assumed that sponsoring firm shareholders own both
pension assets and liabilities (e.g.: Landsman, 1986), and hence their interests are
compatible with those of financial intermediaries.
7. Standards for pension fund financial reporting were subsequently mandated by
government regulation (Superannuation Industry Standards Act 1994), which is
conceptually similar to equivalent USA (Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 1974) and UK (Pension Act, 1995) pension laws.
8. This is consistent with the results of prior survey research (i.e.: Anderson and
Sharpe, 1992; Klumpes, 1994b; Herbohn and Buchan, 1995).
9. DISCL was alternatively examined as a dichotomous variable where pension
plans were classified as either fully complying with AAS 25 ‘general purpose
financial reports’ (coded 1) or not (coded 0). However this alternative
specification, when substituted for the categorical variable DISCL, did not
significantly alter the results of the tests reported in section 4 below.  The
categorical variable is preferred because it recognises more adequately the full
extent of significant cross-sectional variation in voluntary financial disclosure
practices across the sample of pension funds during the study period.
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Table 1
Factors influencing pressure groups and competition for political influence
Descriptive Statistics for Sample and Population of Pension Funds
Panel A: Defined Benefit Pension Funds (Population Size 3,209; Sample Size N =54)
        Population                                     Sample                                    
                        Mean               Mean               Min.                Max.              Std Dev.
MARCOST 0.52  0.35 0.00 1.40  0.33
MARFEE 0.96  0.75 0.04 3.30  0.57
PAS n.a.  0.00 0.00             1.00  0.46
DISCL n.a.  1.85             0.00 5.00              1.25
INVRISK         n.a. 73.81            16.44 99.69            14.08
MATRISK        n.a. -1.40           -39.56 51.59 12.30
LNSIZE    3.23  3.71 1.36 8.16 1.57
Panel B Defined Contribution Pension Funds (Population Size 1,370; Sample Size N
=54)
        Population                                     Sample                                    
                        Mean               Mean               Min.            Max.             Std Dev.
MARCOST 1.93 0.90 0.01 5.00  1.09
MARFEE 8.7 2.19 0.04 6.50  1.83
PAS n.a.  0.63 0.00             1.00  0.49
DISCL n.a.  1.85             0.00 5.00              1.25
INVRISK         n.a. 62.33 0.00 100.00            28.70
MATRISK       n.a. 20.61         -28.59 100.00            25.38
LNSIZE  4.89  3.71 0.09 6.79  1.64
Variable descriptions
PAS = A dummy variable indicating the extent of voluntary compliance with
Australian Accounting Standards in audited accounts as at 30 June 1993, from no
compliance or industry-recommended guidelines (=0) to professional Australian
Accounting Standard 25 (=1).
DISCL = A categorical variable extent of voluntary disclosure of financial information
items in annual member reports issued as at 30 June, varying from no disclosure (=0)
to disclosure of five items (=5).
MARFEE = Marginal periodic fees charged by financial intermediaries to pension
plan for year ending 30 June 1993 as a percentage of total net assets (in A$M).
MARCOST = Marginal periodic expenses incurred by pension plan, other than
financial intermediary fees, for year ending 30 June 1993 as a percentage of net assets
(in A$M).
INVRISK = Percentage of total invested assets of pension plan, as at 30 June 1993,
comprising risky investment classes (e.g.: shares, real estate).
MATRISK = Net contributions for year ended 30 June 1993 (in A$M).
LNSIZE = Natural log of total pension fund assets, as at 30 June 1993 (in A$M).
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Table 2
Factors influencing pressure groups and competition for political influence
Bivariate Correlations Between Variables
Panel A: Defined Benefit Pension Funds
COST    FEE INVRISK      LNSIZE MATRISK    PAS     DISCLXT
COST 1.000
FEE 0.652**  1.000
INVRISK        -0.176   0.139      1.000
LNSIZE -0.327*   -0.609**   -0.114 1.000
MATRISK 0.055   -0.056     0.095        -0.137     1.000
PAS -0.300*   -0.217     -0.296* -0.298*      0.127        1.000
DISCLXT -0.230   -0.186      -0.149   0.106      0.086        0.414**         1.000
Panel B: Defined Contribution Pension Funds
COST    FEE INVRISK      LNSIZE MATRISK  PAS DISCLXT
COST 1.000
FEE 0.657**  1.000
INVRISK 0.322*   0.139    1.000
LNSIZE -0.134   0.044     -0.192  1.000
MATRISK 0.144    0.265    -0.145 0.214 1.000
PAS -0.239   -0.459**     -0.111 -0.258 -0.141      1.000
DISCLXT   -0.059   -0.191     0.007 -0.010 -0.105       0.032      1.000
** Significant at 0.01 level
*   Significant at 0.05 level
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Table 3
Factors influencing pressure groups and competition for political influence
Defined benefit funded Australian pension plans (DBPPs)
(2SLS, Standard errors in parentheses)
 FEE             COST             LNSIZE
                        Equation (7)                Equation (8)              Equation (9)
Panel A: Marginal Cost and Fee Functions
MARCOST 1.08a  0.80
(0.20) (0.68)
MARFEE  0.37a -1.88a
(0.06) (0.39)
PAS -0.05                0.79c
(0.15) (0.42)






Adj R2 0.42 0.45 0.38
Panel B: Log Cost and Fee Functions




PAS -0.25                0.87b
(0.27) (0.43)
DISCL -0.19             -0.16





Adj R2   0.23  0.18 0.37
a Significant at 0.01 level, one-tailed test.
b Significant at 0.05 level, one-tailed test.
c Significant at 0.10 level, one-tailed test.
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Table 4
Factors influencing pressure groups and competition for political influence
Defined contribution funded Australian pension plans (DCPPs)
(2SLS, Standard errors in parentheses)
FEE             COST             LNSIZE
                        Equation (7)                Equation (8)              Equation(9)
Panel A: Marginal Cost and Fee Functions
MARCOST 1.02a -0.39
           (0.18) (0.27)
MARFEE 0.40a  0.07
(0.07) (0.18)
PAS -1.21a              -0.95c
(0.37) (0.51)






Adj R2 0.54 0.66 0.04
Panel B: Log Cost and Fee Functions
LNCOST 0.45a -0.28
 (0.09) (0.19)
LNFEE  0.80a -0.07
(0.13) (0.26)
PAS -0.74a              -1.17b
 (0.26) (0.51)
DISCL  0.09             -0.02
(0.12) (0.18)
INVRISK 0.001
           (0.004)
MATRISK  0.01b
(0.006)
Adj R2 0.47 0.43 0.06
a Significant at 0.01 level, one-tailed test.
b Significant at 0.05 level, one-tailed test.
c Significant at 0.10 level, one-tailed test.
